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ABSTRACT
The article addresses specifics of trade secret protection under international
investment law. As a particular example, it analyzes protection of pharmaceutical
regulatory data against the background of the growing public policy campaign for
broader access to clinical trial data and the recent unprecedented practice of the
European Medicines Agency of disclosing clinical dossiers submitted for drug
marketing approval. Given the significant role of foreign direct investment in the
global pharmaceutical industry and substantial, exponentially increasing costs
incurred by drug originator companies in conducting clinical trials, the prospect of
investor-state dispute over data disclosure does not appear purely hypothetical. The
question is whether investor-state arbitration is an apt instrument to protect
originators’ data against disclosure by drug regulatory authorities. The analysis
suggests that the application of standards of international investment protection
depends on the specifics of information at issue, its value, and functions in investors’
commercial operations. With regard to pharmaceutical test data, it is argued that
the prospects of investor-state arbitration are rather unfavorable for the investor,
when data is disclosed to support policy objectives in public healthcare and medical
innovation.
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PROTECTING TRADE SECRETS UNDER INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW:
WHAT SECRETS INVESTORS SHOULD NOT TELL STATES
DARIA KIM*
I. INTRODUCTION
“Same same but different.” This catchphrase derived from the title of Detlev
Buck’s movie1 can characterize the standing of trade secrets among other types of
intellectual property (“IP”). Being protected under international law as a category of
IP, trade secrets differ from other types of IP in several aspects. Most importantly,
protection is not mandated in the form of exclusive rights. While there are no
specific qualification requirements for protection, trade secrets can cover vastly
diverse types of information in terms of substantive content, economic value and
functions. Empirical studies show that, in some sectors, firms can rely on trade
secrets equally as on patent protection as a means to appropriate returns on R&D
investment, and, under some circumstances, even to a greater extent.2 The drug
industry is among such sectors.3
Foreign direct investment (“FDI”) has played a considerable role in shaping the
global pharmaceutical industry.4 Particular prominence among factors considered to
have the most relevance for attracting FDI, is attributed to the effective protection of
intellectual property.5 Likewise, IP protection plays an important role in the
domestic regulatory framework in the pharmaceutical sector. So far, the boundaries

* © Daria Kim 2016.
Max Planck Institute for Intellectual Property and Competition Law,
research fellow (2012-2013), Doktorandin (since 2015); the Chinese University of Hong Kong,
Faculty of law, research associate (2013-2014); LL.M., M.A. daria.kim@ip.mpg.de. The author
wishes to thank Professor Julien Chaisse, Professor Bryan C. Mercurio and Dini Sejko for feedback
on the drafts and discussions.
1 SAME SAME BUT DIFFERENT (Boje Buck 2009) Filmhandlung und Hintergrund, KINO.de,
http://www.kino.de/film/same-same-but-different-2009/.
2 See generally Wesley M. Cohen & Richard R. Nelson & John P. Walsh, Protecting Their
Intellectual Assets: Appropriability Conditions and Why U.S. Manufacturing Firms Patent (or Not),
NBER Working Papers 7552, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. (2000); Richard C. Levin
& Alvin K. Klevorick & Richard R. Nelson & Sidney G. Winter, Appropriating the Returns from
Industrial Research and Development, Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Economic Studies
Program, The Brookings Institution, vol. 18(3), 783-832 (1987).
3 Cohen et al., supra note 2, tables 1, 2.
4 THE UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT, WORLD INVESTMENT
REPORT 2014, 13-15 (2014) (reporting on restructuring trends and new market-seeking investments
in the world-wide pharmaceutical industry). According to the UNCTAD, the global FDI in the
pharmaceutical sector is mostly represented in cross-border merger and acquisition deals and
greenfield FDI, the former reaching a peak in 2007 and the latter in 2009. A significant increase
has been observed in cross-border merger and acquisition deals targeting developing and transition
economies from less than four percent before 2006, to ten percent between 2010 and 2012, “jumping
to more than eighteen percent in 2013.” Id. at xvii. The trend is projected to continue to grow. Id.
at 14.
5 See infra note 54.
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of two types of IP rights—trademarks6 and patents7—have been tested in
investor-state arbitration demonstrating the complexity of issues that stretch beyond
economic and industry matters.
This paper addresses protection of another category of IP—trade secrets—in the
context of pharmaceutical FDI and international investment agreements. The
enforcement of trade secret protection has been emphasized by the U.S. in the
framework of the Trans-Pacific Partnership negotiations. In August 2013, the
U.S. Chamber of Commerce released a report calling for “enhanced legal protections
for trade secrets, including criminalization of willful misappropriation and
unauthorized disclosure of trade secrets [to be] elevated on the TPP agenda.” 8
The inclusion of the specific obligation with regard to trade secret protection into
the investment treaty does not only mean raising the level of the enforcement
standard under the national IP law (and, consequently, granting the same level of
protection to all WTO Member states due to the national treatment obligation).
Protection of IP within an investment bears another important implication; it allows
the investor to challenge domestic regulations of a host state that might affect
IP-based assets, including confidential business and commercial information, under
investor-state arbitration.9
This article analyses the specifics of protection of clinical data, as a part of
pharmaceutical FDI, in the context of the evolving international campaign for
greater public disclosure of clinical trial reports submitted for regulatory review.
Most recently, the idea of data sharing has been promoted by initiatives such as the
2015 policy of the European Medicines Agency (“EMA”),10 the 2014/2015 WHO public
consultations,11 and the 2015 Report of the Institute of Medicine of the National

6 Philip Morris Asia Limited v The Commonwealth of Australia, UNCITRAL, PCA Case No.
2012-12; Philip Morris Brands Sàrl, Philip Morris Products S.A. and Abal Hermanos S.A. v Oriental
Republic of Uruguay, ICSID Case No. ARB/10/7.
7 Eli Lilly and Company v The Government of Canada, UNCITRAL, ICSID Case No.
UNCT/14/2.
8 THE US CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, THE CASE FOR ENHANCED PROTECTION OF TRADE SECRETS
IN THE TRANS-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENT 5 (2013).
9 See the Office of the United States Trade Representative, Summary of the Trans-Pacific
Partnership Agreement, available at https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/pressreleases/2015/october/summary-trans-pacific-partnership (last visited Nov. 27, 2015) (stating that
the agreement “provides for neutral and transparent international arbitration of investment
disputes, with strong safeguards to prevent abusive and frivolous claims and ensure the right of
governments to regulate in the public interest, including on health, safety, and environmental
protection. The procedural safeguards include: transparent arbitral proceedings, amicus curiae
submissions, non-disputing Party submissions; expedited review of frivolous claims and possible
award of attorneys’ fees; review procedure for an interim award; binding joint interpretations by
TPP Parties; time limits on bringing a claim; and rules to prevent a claimant pursuing the same
claim in parallel proceedings.”).
10 The EMA, The European Medicines Agency Policy on Publication of Clinical Data for
Medicinal
Products
for
Human
Use,
EMA/240810/2013
(2014)
available
at
http://www.ema.europa.eu/docs/en_GB/document_library/Other/2014/10/WC500174796.pdf
(last
visited Nov. 30, 2015).
11 The World Health Organization, Call for public consultation: WHO Statement on Public
Disclosure of Clinical Trial Results, available at http://www.who.int/ictrp/results/en/ (last visited
Nov. 30, 2015).
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Academies “Sharing Clinical Trial Data: Maximizing Benefits, Minimizing Risk.” 12
In broad terms, benefits of clinical data sharing are associated with healthcare
improvement and scientific progress: access to clinical dossiers can support various
research-related activities, improve efficiency of drug R&D, contribute to greater
transparency and accountability of drug authorities, and reduce the risk of
publication bias in reporting trial results. 13 Among policy initiatives,14 the EMA is
the first drug regulatory authority to start to disclose clinical reports.15 As of
January 2015, access to clinical dossiers submitted for regulatory review can be
provided upon marketing approval of a corresponding drug without the authorization
of and remuneration to data originators under the condition that the data is used for
scientific, non-commercial research purposes and, explicitly, not for generic drug
approval.16
From the scientific perspective, clinical data presents a unique source of
pharmacological knowledge generated during clinical tests about the newly
established effects of a drug on the human body. From the business perspective,
clinical trials are the most investment-intensive and time-consuming stage of drug
R&D. From the regulatory perspective, the submission of clinical trial results that
prove efficiency, quality, and safety are requirements enforced by national drug
authorities before a drug can be released on the market. From the legal perspective,
there is much uncertainty regarding the legal status and substantive rights in
various types of data that are comprised in clinical dossiers. Not surprisingly, public
consultations preceding implementation of the 2015 EMA disclosure policy featured a
heated debate between public interest groups, the scientific community and the
research-based biopharmaceutical industry.17 The U.S. Chamber of Commerce
followed EMA’s initiative with a study alleging that the EMA’s new policy starkly
contrasted with existing international practices.18
The legal basis for the blanket clinical data disclosure is far from clear.
Pharmaceutical regulatory data can be protected against disclosure under trade
secrets, unfair competition, sui generis regime of data exclusivity, as well as

12 The Institute of Medicine of the National Academies, Sharing Clinical Trial Data:
Maximizing
Benefits,
Minimizing
Risk
(2015)
available
at
http://www.iom.edu/Reports/2015/Sharing-Clinical-Trial-Data.aspx (last visited Nov. 10, 2015).
13 See infra notes 127-136.
14 For an overview of international calls for clinical trial data sharing, see, e.g., PC Gøtzsche,
Why We Need Easy Access to All Data from All Clinical Trials and How to Accomplish It, TRIALS,
12:249, at 9-11 (2011).
15 While the EMA earlier policy provided for the “reactive”, or request-based access, the 2015
initiative implements the “pro-active” access to clinical reports on-screen as well as in downloadable
and searchable formats. See the EMA, supra note 10, ¶¶ 4.1, 4.2.1.
16 Id. Annex 1, ¶ 3, Annex 2, ¶ 3.
17 For an overview of the submissions, see the EMA, Publication and access to clinical data: an
inclusive
development
process
(2014)
available
at:
http://www.ema.europa.eu/ema/index.jsp?curl=pages/special_topics/general/general_content_000556.
jsp (last visited Nov. 27, 2015).
18 The U.S. Chamber of Commerce & Global Intellectual Property Center, Heading in a
Different Direction? The European Medicines Agency’s Policy on the Public Release of Clinical Trials
Data, at 2 (2014) available at http://www.theglobalipcenter.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/EMAStudy-COMPLETE.pdf (last visited Oct. 30, 2015).
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administrative law.19 The Court of Justice of the European Union has recently
considered two cases in which pharmaceutical companies—AbbVie and InterMune—
objected to the EMA’s decisions to grant access to their clinical data upon request by
a third party.20 Protection of data confidentiality was claimed on the basis of
Article 7 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, Article 8 of
the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, and Article 339 of the Treaty of the Foundation of the European Union.
Interim injunctions against the EMA’s disclosure granted by the General Court of the
European Union were, later on, overturned by the European Court’s Vice-President
and referred back to the General Court to examine the possibility of partial access to
the clinical study reports if applicants could establish “with a sufficient degree of
probability” the likelihood of “serious and irreparable damage” by third parties’
access to some of the contents.21
The issue of data disclosure is particularly relevant in the context of
pharmaceutical FDI. In many cases, the originator and holder of clinical data would
be a pharmaceutical multinational company submitting reports on clinical studies for
regulatory review on behalf of a local subsidiary. In a more generalized scenario—
abstracting from the particular example of pharmaceutical test data—similar
investment protection claims can arise when business-related information is
submitted for regulatory clearance procedures, and such data is subsequently
disclosed by a local authority on public interest grounds. 22 In a broader perspective,
issues analysed here pertain to the conflict between private interests in data
confidentiality and public interests in access to information; ultimately raising the
question of reconciling the two when the state exercises its right to regulate in
matters of utmost public interest.

19 It is assumed that, in most jurisdictions, the submission of test data for a regulatory review
for the purpose of marketing approval would not qualify as public disclosure, neither involve the
transfer of originators’ rights in data.
20 Case T-44/13, AbbVie, Inc., AbbVie Ltd. V. EMA, (C.J.E.U. 2014) (delivered July 17, 2014);
InterMune UK and Others v. EMA, Case T-73/13, (C.J.E.U. 2013) (delivered April 25, 2013). Since
2010, the EMA has been granting access to clinical trial reports submitted for the EU marketing
authorization on the request basis.
21 See Case C-389/13P(R), European Medicines Agency (EMA) v. AbbVie Inc. and AbbVie Ltd.,
Order of the Vice-President of the Court, Nov. 28, 2013, ¶ 51; Case C-390/13P(R), European
Medicines Agency v. InterMune UK, et. al, Order of the Vice-President of the Court, dated Nov. 28,
2013, ¶ 54. Upon the issuance of the Vice-President Orders, proceedings in both cases were
discontinued pursuant to the applicants’ requests. See Case T-73/13, InterMune UK, et. al v.
European Medicines Agency, Order of the President of the Forth Chamber of the General Court of
June 29, 2015(1); see also Case T-44/13, AbbVie Inc., v. European Medicines Agency, Order of the
President of the General Court, of April 8, 2014).
22 See Tony Harris, Diane Nicol, & Nicholas Gruen, Pharmaceutical Patents Review Report
2013,
at
169
(2013)
available
at
http://www.ipaustralia.gov.au/pdfs/2013-0527_PPR_Final_Report.pdf (last visited Jan. 13, 2016) (recommending that the Australian
“Government should actively contribute to the development of an internationally coordinated and
harmonized system where data protection is provided in exchange for the publication of clinical trial
data”). See also Tania Rabesandratana, Europe’s food watchdog embraces transparency, SCIENCE
(Oct. 23, 2015)), http://www.sciencemag.org/content/350/6259/368.full (last visited Nov. 30, 2015)
(reporting a similar initiative announced by the European Food Safety Authority to make public the
data submitted for food safety evaluation and highlighting industry concerns that “the openness—
which will extend to detailed industry reports—could threaten trade secrets”).
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Against this background, this paper analyses the prospects of a hypothetical
dispute over the disclosure of clinical data by a drug regulatory authority in the
context of investor-state arbitration.23 In particular, it addresses the questions: Does
clinical data qualify for protection as a foreign investment? What standards of
protection under international investment law can the investor invoke, and what are
the specifics of their application in a particular case of disclosure of clinical dossiers?
How would public and private interests stack up, and how can the balancing of
interests be approached? The analysis is structured as follows. Part II considers
whether clinical data qualifies as the subject matter of protection under an
international investment agreement (“IIA”). Part III analyzes how the standards of
investment protection apply in a dispute over the regulatory disclosure of clinical
dossiers and focuses on the standards of expropriation (drawing an analogy with
compulsory licensing for patents) and fair and equitable treatment (reflecting on the
notion of “legitimate expectations”). Part IV concludes.
II. CLINICAL DATA AS THE SUBJECT MATTER OF PROTECTION UNDER INVESTMENT LAW
A claim for investment protection shall be subject to the tribunal’s ratione
materiae jurisdiction if the claimant made an investment in the host state: Do
dossiers submitted for drug marketing approval qualify as protected subject matter
under international investment law?
A. The Economic Characterization of Clinical Data as Foreign Investment
In the economic sense, foreign investment can be defined as a “commitment of
resources to the economy of the host state . . . entailing the assumption of risk in
expectation of a commercial return.”24 Although there is no “legally binding

23 One may wonder whether the investor-state arbitration is an apt instrument for the investor
to protect regulatory data against disclosure. In the first place, the investor would probably seek to
obtain injunctive relief as a remedy rather than the ex post disclosure compensation. Once the data
are released into public domain, the consequences can be irreversible: the data originator cannot
control or prohibit the subsequent use of third parties of the data disclosed by public authorities.
Although investor-state tribunals usually grant relief in the form of monetary damages, the
availability of injunctive relief is not excluded. See Article 47 of the ICSID Convention and Rule 39
of the ICSID Arbitration Rules; Article 26 of the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules. See also Christoph
Schreuer, Non-Pecuniary Remedies in ICSID Arbitration, 20 Arb. Int’l 325, 326 (2004) (noting that
“the [ICSID] Convention’s drafting history indicates that an ICSID tribunal has the power not only
to award monetary damages, but also to order a party to perform a specific act or to desist from a
particular course of action”).
24 ZACHARY DOUGLAS, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF INVESTMENT CLAIMS, 161 (Cambridge
University Press, 2009). See Mahnaz Malik, Recent Developments in the Definition of Investment in
International Investment Agreements, Second Annual Forum of Developing Country Investment
Negotiators 3-4 at 6, (November 2008), available at http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2008/dci_recent_dev.pdf
(last visited Oct. 30, 2015) (noting, with regard to intellectual property, that to qualify as an
investment, intellectual property, like any other type of asset, “must have the characteristics of an
investment, such as the commitment of capital or other resources, the expectation of gain or profit,
or the assumption of risk”).
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definition” of investment under international investment law, 25 several tribunals
referred to the characteristics distinguished in the Salini v Morocco case.26 Having
admitted the lack of “real discussion” of the criteria for characterization of an
investment in earlier cases,27 the tribunal in Salini summarized that “the doctrine
generally considers that investment infers: contributions, a certain duration of
performance of the contract and a participation in the risks of the transaction.” 28 As
an additional condition, contribution to the economic development of a host State was
mentioned in relation to the Preamble of the ICSID Convention.29 Furthermore, the
tribunal held that, although “in reality, these various elements may be
interdependent,” they “should be assessed globally.” 30 In that context, ‘globally’ could
be interpreted as considered altogether, in their overall effect.
It is somewhat curious that, in subsequent decisions, tribunals referred to the
abovementioned elements as the ‘Salini test.’31 The broad wording gives a general
idea rather than stipulate a legal standard as a set of specific qualifying factors.
These criteria can be seen as neither absolute nor binding.32 Under such a broad
approach, clinical dossiers can be notionally recognized as part of a foreign
investment, especially since many IIAs explicitly incorporate intangible assets into
the definition of investment.33 However, further questions arise: Does it matter that
the R&D activity—i.e., clinical trials and drug development—took place in a country
other than the host state and not necessarily for the purpose of obtaining marketing
authorization in that particular host state? With respect to drugs, for which
marketing approval is sought in a foreign jurisdiction, does it matter where such
drugs were originally produced?

25 YARASLAU KRYVOI, INTERNATIONAL CENTRE FOR SETTLEMENT OF INVESTMENT DISPUTES, 58
(Kluwer Law International 2010).
26 Salini Costruttori S.p.A. and Italstrade S.p.A. v. Kingdom of Morocco, ICSID Case No.
ARB/00/4, (September 25, 2000). Although the Salini factors were developed and mostly applied in
the arbitration under the ICSID Convention, their application has not been limited to the ICSID
arbitration. See, e.g., Romak S.A. v. The Republic of Uzbekistan, UNCITRAL, PCA Case No. AA280,
Award, ¶¶ 190-195 (Nov. 26, 2009).
27 Salini et al v Morocco, ICSID Case No. ARB/00/4, Decision on Jurisdiction, ¶ 52 (Jul. 23,
2001).
28 Id., ¶ 52 (emphasis added).
29 Id.
30 Id.
31 For an overview of tribunal decisions applying, interpreting and modifying the Salini criteria,
see, e.g., Alex Grabowski, The Definition of Investment under the ICSID Convention: A Defense of
Salini, CHICAGO JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 15 (1), (2014).
32 See, e.g., Philip Morris Brands Sarl, et. al v. Oriental Republic of Uruguay, ICSID Case No.
ARB/10/7, Decision on Jurisdiction, ¶ 185, (July 2, 2013) (stating that “[t]he Salini criteria are not
jurisdictional requirements. Most of the tribunals that have examined these criteria have used them
as typical characteristics rather than as jurisdictional requirements”).
33 For detailed guidelines on the accounting of drug development costs as intangible assets
under international accounting standards IAS 38.8, see PWC, International Financial Reporting
Standards (IFRS) Issues and solutions for the pharmaceuticals and life sciences industries (2012)
available at http://www.pwc.nl/nl_NL/nl/assets/documents/pwc-ifrs-issues-and-solutions-for-thepharmaceutical-industry-july-2012-vol-1-and-2.pdf (last visited Nov. 26, 2015).
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1. The Apotex case
Similar concerns were addressed by the tribunal in the Apotex v. United States
case,34 in which the Canadian pharmaceutical company contested the U.S. FDA’s
decisions that had rejected its applications for marketing authorisation for two
generic drugs. The claimant alleged that it had “made substantial ‘investments,’
including, but not limited to, the expenditure of millions of dollars each year in
preparing ANDAs35 for filing in the United States, and formulating, developing, and
manufacturing approved generic pharmaceutical products for sale in the United
States and throughout the world;” this qualified as investment in the meaning of
Article 1139 of the NAFTA Agreement.36 The U.S. argued that Apotex’s activities in
the territory of the United States with respect to sales of the two generic products in
casu were “those of an exporter, not an investor,” while the sales were made by the
U.S.-based distributors.37 The argument was upheld by the UNCITRAL tribunal
which affirmed that the claimant’s activities in relation to drug regulatory approval
in the country of exportation did not qualify as “an ‘investment’ in and of itself,
within the meaning and scope of NAFTA Article 1139.” 38 Consequently, the case was
dismissed due to the tribunal’s lack of jurisdiction.
According to one opinion, Apotex’s “critical omission” was “its failure to develop
a claim that its U.S. affiliate [Apotex Corp.] was independently a NAFTA
investment.”39 However, had Apotex submitted the claim on behalf of its U.S.-based
affiliate, would it, in principle, change the nature of Apotex’s business in the U.S—
i.e., sales through the affiliated agent and distributor? 40 At the end, the tribunal was
“unpersuaded” that such affiliate independently qualified as investment of “an
interest in an enterprise” for the purposes of NAFTA Art 1139(e).41
It is common that pharmaceutical multi-national corporations (“MNCs”) conduct
the majority of clinical trials in one country and use essentially the same dataset to
obtain marketing authorization in multiple jurisdictions.42 Such a situation is not
unique to clinical data: technologies can be patented and commercially utilized in
multiple jurisdictions irrespective of where the corresponding R&D was conducted.

34 Apotex Holdings Inc. and Apotex Inc. v. United States of America, ICSID Case
No. ARB(AF)/12/1 (August 25, 2014).
35 ANDA stands for an Abbreviated New Drug Application – the term used by the U.S. Food and
Drug Administration to refer to an application for a generic drug approval.
36 Apotex v. the United States of America, Notice of Arbitration under Chapter 11 of the NAFTA,
¶ 111 (Jun. 4, 2009).
37 Apotex Inc. v United States of America, Memorial on Objections to Jurisdiction of Respondent
United States of America, May 16, 2011, ¶ 44-45 (citation omitted).
38 Apotex Inc. v the Government of the United States of America, Award on Jurisdiction and
Admissibility, ¶ 243-245 (Jun. 14, 2013).
39 Julian D. Mortenson, Apotex v United States: Narrowing NAFTA’s Definition of ‘Investment’,
Case comment, 16 JOURNAL OF WORLD INVESTMENT & Trade, 163, 168 (2015).
40 Apotex (Award), supra note 38, ¶¶ 235-6.
41 Apotex (Award), supra note 38, ¶ 238, footnote 108 (noting that “there was no evidence that
Apotex Corp was an “investment” of Apotex, or that Apotex had an interest in it, such as to satisfy
NAFTA Chapter Eleven”).
42 There are ethical arguments against risk exposure of humans and animals if clinical trials
had to be repeated for the same drug in each jurisdiction, where marketing authorization is sought.
Some jurisdictions may require one to conduct a part of clinical trials on the local population.
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Yet, patents are commonly recognized as a category of assets within the investment
definition under IIAs.43
The Apotex decision points out an important distinction between a foreign
investment as the business activity, and investment as costs incurred to create a
business asset. This suggests that, even though a certain asset can explicitly be
mentioned under an IIA, its qualification for protection as an investment should be
analysed in conjunction with the economic activity of a foreign entity. If the business
activity of the clinical data-holder is recognized as a foreign investment, costs related
to conducting clinical trials can be seen as related expenditures (akin to the notion of
the “pre-investment” that enables business operations in a host state). However, the
interests arising in relation to the investment as resources committed to a host
state’s economy, rather than the recovery of the costs of creating a particular asset,
would be subject to protection.44
2. The issue of contribution to the economic development of a host state
Contribution to the economic development of a host country was mentioned in
the Salini decision as an additional criterion. Indeed, the developmental dimension
of international investment rulemaking has been addressed in terms of the
prospective agenda rather than the actual state of affairs.45 In more pragmatic
43 See generally the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Intellectual
Property Provisions in International Investment Agreements, IIA Monitor No. 1,
UNCTAD/WEB/ITE/IIA/2007/1 (2007); Norway’s Draft Model Agreement for the Promotion and
Protection of Investments, Art. 2(2) (2007); the U.S. Model BIT, Art. 1 (2004). See also The
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, The Multilateral Agreement on
Investment Draft Consolidated Text, DAFFE/MAI(98)7/REV1, at 7 (1998) (noting that “further work
[was] necessary to clarify the relationship of the MAI [multilateral agreements on investment] to
other international agreements that relate to intellectual property, particularly where these
conventions might require standards of treatment which differ from the MAI or where these
conventions provide for dispute settlement mechanisms”).
44 See Douglas, supra note 24, at 187, 257 (arguing that “the notion of a ‘pre-investment’ is
meaningless” while the decisive factors for the investment definition are (i) whether the
expenditures in the host state related to the acquisition of a property right that has the
characteristics of, at least, one of the categories of an investment as defined by the relevant
investment agreement, and (ii) the economic characteristics of an investment have materialized for
the purpose of committing resources to the host state’s economy, whereby the claimant bears a risk
related to commercial returns).
45 See, e.g., Omar E. García-Bolívar, Defining an ICSID Investment: Why Economic Development
Should be the Core Element (2012) available at https://www.iisd.org/itn/2012/04/13/defining-an-icsidinvestment-why-economic-development-should-be-the-core-element/ (last visited Mar. 14, 2016)
(highlighting the lack of the explicit textual reference between the treatment of investment and the
goals to promote economic development in international investment agreements); see also The
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Development Implications of International
Investment Agreements, IIA Monitor No., UNCTAD/WEB/ITE/IIA/2007/2, at 7 (2007) (arguing that,
“to the extent that the development dimension is addressed in international investment rulemaking,
it is done in an indirect manner and in a primarily defensive mode, in order to shield contracting
parties permanently or temporarily from assuming their full responsibilities under the agreement”);
The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Investment Promotion Provisions in
International Investment Agreements (2008) (suggesting that “[c]onsideration could be given to
developing guidelines on corporate economic development contributions to specifically address
economic development concerns”). See generally Stephan W. Schill, International Investment Law as
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terms, one can see foreign investment as “essentially about the acquisition of a
cross-border claim to income in the hope of getting a return in the future.” 46 At the
same time, the developmental aspect of foreign investment cannot be completely
ignored. Its importance can be seen in at least two aspects: as forming the
interpretative context for international investment dispute resolution, 47 and as
pertaining to the balance of commitments. 48 The latter can be considered as an
inherent quid pro quo in relation to the host state’s motivation to ensure a favourable
environment supporting investors’ businesses and protecting investments.
In the Philip Morris v. Uruguay dispute over tobacco plain packaging legislation,
Uruguay objected to the tribunal jurisdiction for the reason, among others, that the
alleged investment did not satisfy the contribution-to-development criterion of the
Salini test. It was argued that the claimant’s activities imposed “huge costs” on
Uruguay49 and “the ‘net contributions’ to the economic development made by the
Claimants’ interests and activities in Uruguay has been overwhelmingly negative.” 50
That argument was dismissed by the tribunal. First of all, it did not consider the
Salini criteria as “jurisdictional requirements to the effect that the absence of one or
the other of these elements would imply a lack of jurisdiction.” 51 Furthermore, it
held that the notion of “investment” under Article 25(1) of the ICSID Convention was
intentionally unspecified to cover “a wide range of economic operations confirming
the broad scope of its application.” 52 However, the scope could not be stretched
limitlessly and its “outer limits” would not encompass “a single commercial
transaction, such as the mere delivery of goods against payment of the price.” 53
Suffice it to say, the developmental aspect has not been perceived by tribunals
as a mandatory legal criterion for the purpose of investment definition and
protection. Even if it were so, such requirement would not be problematic for
IP-based assets. Contribution to socio-economic and technological development has
International Development Law, in YEARBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND POLICY
2012-2013, 327-356 (Bjorklund A.K., ed., 2014).
46 Steffen Hindelang, Balancing the Rights and Obligations of States and Investors by Marrying
Foreign Investment Protection off to Sustainable Development? Speaking Notes, 24th Meeting of the
Energy Charter Conference – Nicosia/Cyprus, at 2 (Dec. 5, 2013) available at
http://www.encharter.org/fileadmin/user_upload/Conferences/2013_Dec_5-6/4-3_Hindelang.pdf (last
visited Oct. 22, 2015).
47 The
ICSID
Convention,
first
Preamble,
available
at
https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/StaticFiles/basicdoc/partA-preamble.htm (“Considering the need
for international cooperation for economic development, and the role of private international
investment therein . . . .”).
48 These two aspects are interrelated. For instance, as highlighted in the Malicorp v. Egypt
award, “the notion of investment must be understood from the perspective of the objectives sought
by the Agreement and the ICSID Convention. They are there to ‘promote’ investments, that is to
say, to create the conditions that will encourage foreign nationals to make contributions and provide
services in the host country, but also, and to that end, to ‘protect’ the fruits of such contributions and
services.” Malicorp v. Egypt, Award, ¶ 110 (February 7, 2011).
49 Philip Morris v. Uruguay, supra note 32, ¶ 177.
50 Id., ¶ 182 (alleging that “[b]ased on the Claimants’ own inflated estimate, their combined
contributions total around US $ 29 million per year, more than offset just by the direct health care
costs of US $ 30 million”).
51 Id., ¶ 206.
52 Id., ¶ 200.
53 Id., ¶ 203.
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been viewed as the main justification for establishing the international system for IP
protection allowing WTO member states to benefit from greater FDI and technology
transfer.54 This discussion does not intend to contribute to the debate regarding the
extent to which this proposition holds true in general, or insofar as trade secrets are
concerned. It is worth mentioning, however, that the relationship between trade
secrets and innovation is not formalized as, for instance, in the case of patent
protection that is granted vis-à-vis public disclosure and dissemination of technical
knowledge. The sole value of trade secrets subsists in confidentiality; their contents
and value can vary substantially. There is no “trade secret office” that, akin to a
patent office, would assess whether a certain piece of information meets the merits of
protection justified by its contribution to innovation. If a trade secret covers
technical know-how, its transfer to a local subsidiary under a confidentiality
agreement can be viewed as a contribution to technological development. 55 As far as
clinical data are concerned, one can argue that local partners can learn from the
scientific data, methodology and know-how contained in clinical dossiers. In this
sense, clinical trial data can be viewed as contributing to development of the
technical capacity of local subsidiaries.56
B. The legal characterization of clinical data as an investment
The legal characterization of a foreign investment—tangibles as well as
intangibles—is contingent upon securing property rights as recognized under the
domestic law of the host state. 57 Protection of trade secrets is perhaps the least
harmonized area of IP law. Jurisdictions can vary substantially in defining the legal

54 Studies, in general, find a positive relation between the growth of FDI and the strength of IP
protection. For an overview of literature on this expansive subject. See generally The World
Intellectual Property Organization, 2009 Report on International Patent System (2009); Keith E.
Maskus, The Role of Intellectual Property Rights for Technology Transfer in Encouraging Foreign
Direct Investment and Technology Transfer, 9 Duke J. Comp. & Intern’l L. 109 (1998); Branstetter et
al, Intellectual Property Rights, Imitation, and Foreign Direct Investment: Theory and Evidence,
NBER Working Paper 13033 (2007).
55 In Salini, for example, the tribunal held that the investors contributed to the economic
development of the Moroccan State by providing the know-how in relation to the contracted work
(Salini, supra note 27, ¶ 57). On the importance of partnerships with pharmaceutical MNCs as a
source of local technological capacity building, see, e.g., The United Nations Conference on Trade
and Development, LOCAL PRODUCTION OF PHARMACEUTICALS AND RELATED TECHNOLOGY
TRANSFER IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (2011) (reporting on the case studies of the pharmaceutical
FDI in developing countries and highlighting the role of the FDI in establishing, improving and
expanding the local pharmaceutical production capacity, as well as the role of the related technology
transfer for technological upgrading of the local subsidiaries).
56 The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, LOCAL PRODUCTION OF
PHARMACEUTICALS AND RELATED TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (2011) at
243-4 (reporting on the influenza vaccine project implemented by the WHO in Thailand and stating
that “technical know-how and access to regulatory dossiers may present more significant challenges
than patent issues.” Within the framework of the project, clinical dossiers, alongside with research
and production related materials were comprised within “one technology package [that could] enable
technology transfer in a cost-effective and timely manner.”).
57 Douglas, supra note 24, at 52.
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status, substantive rights, type and scope of protection in confidential information. 58
As far as undisclosed information is concerned, the reference point under
international IP law is Article 39 of the TRIPS Agreement 59 that, in contrast to other
IP categories, does not obligate WTO member states to grant protection in the form of
exclusive rights. Instead, the provision presents a peculiar combination of unfair
competition, trade secret and sui generis regimes of protection. To claim investment
protection of data in a host state, the law of that state should recognize a right in rem
in clinical data.60 The contents of a clinical dataset comprise a broad range of
miscellaneous data: some might qualify as commercial information, some as
technological know-how, while some might qualify as scientific findings.61
Substantive rights in clinical data might vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction; their
recognition and scope, and entitlement to ownership are less certain than in the case
of patents, which are secured upon the formal acquisition of rights (again, there is no
“office of trade secrets” that would assess “secrecy claims” and issue a certificate of
entitlement to the exclusive right). While a patent application62 can confer on the
applicant a property-type right to exclude third parties’ unauthorized use of the
claimed subject matter, in the case of an application for drug marketing approval, the
administrative decision does not confer an entitlement in property right in data.
Hence, neither application for marketing authorization, nor the marketing
authorization itself possesses the legal characterisation of investment. Likewise, in
the Apotex case, the tribunal did not consider whether there were property rights in
clinical data as such. However, as far as an application for marketing authorization
was concerned, it was “not persuaded that an ANDA [Abbreviated New Drug
Application] must be characterized as ‘property’ for the purposes of NAFTA Article

58 For instance, in the U.S., the regulatory framework applicable to clinical data includes the
Freedom of Information Act, regulations of the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetics Act and the
Federal Trade Secrets Act, state trade secret law, constitutional takings doctrine. See Mustafa
Ünlü, It Is Time: Why the FDA Should Start Disclosing Drug Trial Data, 16 MICH. TELECOMM.
TECH. L. REV. 511, 520 (2010) (concluding that such “confusing, complicated, and sometimes
contradictory regime contributes to the creation of legal bottlenecks”). For differences among the
EU countries, see The European Commission, Study on Trade Secrets and Confidential Business
Information in the Internal Market, MARKT/2011/128/D (2013); see also The U.S. Chamber of
Commerce, supra note 8, at 22-24 (reporting on wide variances among the countries of the
Trans-Pacific Partnership in terms of trade secret protection, especially in the availability of
criminal sanctions).
59 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights art. 39 (3), April 15,
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, Legal
Instruments—Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 1197 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement].
60 Douglas, supra note 24, at 161.
61 For the specification of the content and structure of clinical dossiers submitted for the
regulatory review, see, e.g., International Conference on Harmonization of Technical Requirements
for Registration of Pharmaceuticals for Human Use, the Common Technical Document,
http://www.ich.org/products/ctd.html (last visited Nov. 29, 2015) (comprising guidelines for drug
quality, safety and efficacy reporting).
62 For a discussion concerning whether patent applications qualify as investment, see Bryan C.
Mercurio, Awakening the Sleeping Giant: Intellectual Property Rights in International Investment
Agreements, JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW 15(3), 871, 876-880 (2012) (concluding
that “it is extremely likely that an application for certain IPRs would normally be included within
the scope of IIAs”).
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1139(g) because it contain[ed] ‘confidential data and information.’” 63 Notably, the
tribunal held that
Apotex may have a right under U.S. law to have its disclosures to the
FDA kept confidential, but there is no basis for this to transform the
inherent nature of the ANDA itself, from an application for
permission to export goods into the United States, into some form of
investment within the scope of NAFTA Article 1139(g).64
This statement suggests that, for the purpose of assessing whether an individual
asset qualifies as an investment, the nature of the business activity would prevail
over the legal status of the asset at issue. An investment agreement can explicitly
incorporate intellectual property into the investment definition. 65 However, in the
event of a dispute, a particular IP asset should be analysed in relation to the
claimant’s economic activity in a host state. In Philip Morris v Uruguay, for
instance, the tribunal did not analyse trademark rights affected by the contested
regulatory measure in isolation from other assets specified by the claimant as its
investment, but awarded jurisdiction based on the overall assessment of the
claimant’s activities in Uruguay.66
For the purpose of further analysis, we assume that the claimant would not be
engaged merely in exporting activity but would carry out drug development and
manufacturing in a country that adopts data disclosure policy after the investment
was made. In this sense, clinical dossiers would form a part of a foreign investment,
as they would enable an enterprise to obtain marketing authorization and perform
business operations in a host state.67
III. THE APPLICABLE STANDARD OF PROTECTION
There are substantive differences in the nature and scope of protection between
international investment and IP law. Currently, 161 WTO member states are bound
by the TRIPS Agreement to implement minimum standards of IP protection. In
many cases, multilateral free trade agreements (“FTAs”) stipulate higher protection

Apotex v United States, supra note 38, ¶ 219.
Id. (emphasis added).
65 For an overview of investment agreements that incorporate intellectual property as
investment, see, e.g., Liberti, L., Intellectual Property Rights in International Investment Agreements:
An Overview, OECD Working Papers on International Investment (2010); R.A. Lavery, Coverage of
Intellectual Property Rights in International Investment Agreements: An Empirical Analysis of
Definitions in a Sample of Bilateral Investment Treaties and Free Trade Agreements, 2
TRANSNATIONAL DISPUTE MANAGEMENT (2009).
66 Philip Morris v. Uruguay, supra note 32, ¶¶ 221-235. Besides trademarks, assets claimed by
Philip Morris as its investment included manufacturing facilities, shares in an enterprise, rights to
royalty payments. Id., ¶ 183.
67 M SORNARAJAH, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT 7 (2004) (defining that
foreign investment “involves the transfer of tangible or intangible assets from one country into
another for the purpose of their use in that country to generate wealth under the total or partial
control of the owner of the assets”).
63
64
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standards for IP.68 In this regard, clarification might be needed on the relationship
between investment and IP protection: do investors obtain new rights in their IP
assets under investment agreements, in addition to protection under IP law? In
contrast to IP rights, which are absolute, under an IIA the investor does not acquire
a new right in rem, but a contractual right to enforce obligations under the respective
agreement. Protection of IP within a foreign investment shifts protection claim into
another legal paradigm and renders a different enforcement scenario. While IP
protection targets infringement by users,69 investment protection can be invoked in
disputes against state policy measures. For instance, in the two above-mentioned
IP-related disputes, Philip Morris sought the suspension of the legislation and
compensation alleging the loss of the commercial value of its trademarks, and
Eli Lilly contested patentability requirements under Canadian patent law.
The rest of this section analyses how the standards of expropriation and fair and
equitable treatment (FET) can apply to investment claims against regulatory
disclosure of clinical data. Other investment protection standards that deal with the
arbitrary treatment of investors are not considered here, as it is assumed that, in
principle, data disclosure policy is not directed at foreign companies or a particular
investor but applies to all holders of drug marketing authorization. 70
A. The assessment under the Expropriation Standard
As mentioned, the legal status of and substantive rights in clinical data can vary
from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. However, irrespective of how legal title in clinical
data is determined, data disclosure by a drug authority, in principle, does not involve
the transfer of ownership to the government or a third party, nor does it create a
68 For recent statistics on the IP-related pharmaceutical provisions in trade agreements, see
Raymundo Valdés & Maegan McCann, Intellectual Property Provisions in Regional Trade
Agreements: Revision and Update, World Trade Organization, Economic Research and Statistics
Division (2014) available at http://www10.iadb.org/intal/intalcdi/PE/2014/14788.pdf (last visited
Nov. 26, 2015) (examining the sample of 245 regional trade agreements [RTAs] notified to the WTO
and in force by February 2014. The statistical analysis accounts for the increase in RTAs with
provisions related to pharmaceuticals including patent linkage and clinical data protection which
“would be even more apparent if the agreements establishing the EEC, EFTA and the Andean
Community were excluded from the count as initially they did not contain significant pharmarelated provisions as such but rather established the legal frameworks within which such provisions
were subsequently introduced.”). For a comprehensive coverage of the adoption of TRIPS-plus
standards via bilateral and regional free trade agreements, see generally DAVID VIVAS EUGUL,
REGIONAL AND BILATERAL AGREEMENTS AND A TRIPS-PLUS WORLD: THE FREE TRADE AREA OF THE
AMERICAS (FTAA) (2003); Carlos M. Correa, Bilateralism in Intellectual Property: Defeating the
WTO System for Access to Medicines, 36 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 79 (2004); Peter Drahos, BITs and
BIPs: Bilateralism in Intellectual Property, 4 J. WORLD INTELL. PROP. 791 (2001); Richard E.
Feinberg, The Political Economy of United States’ Free Trade Arrangements, 26 WORLD ECON. 1019
(2003); Ruth L. Okediji, Back to Bilateralism? Pendulum Swings in International Intellectual
Property Protection, 1 U. OTTAWA L. & TECH. J. 127 (2004).
69 See TRIPS Agreement art. 43-47, 50 (stipulating obligations to provide for remedies against
third party’s unauthorized acts).
70 For instance, in the case of the EMA, any applicant’s data submitted for the EMA’s review
can be subject to disclosure upon the grant of the EU marketing authorization, irrespective of the
country of domicile of the applicant.
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limitation on the use or withdrawal of marketing authorization issued on the basis of
the submitted data. Hence, there is no direct expropriation. What appears less
certain is whether the disclosure of data for experimental use interferes with the
investor’s business activity to an extent that it can amount to investment (indirect)
expropriation.
In the Apotex case, the pharmaceutical company argued that the U.S. breached
its obligation under NAFTA Article 1110 by interfering with and expropriating
Apotex’s property rights in applications for generic drug approval, in particular, by
(i) “delaying Apotex’s eligibility for final approval and timely entry into the generic
pravastatin market” and, thus, “substantially depriving Apotex of the benefits of its
investments in its generic pravastatin ANDA,” and (ii) by “unlawfully redistributing
the financial benefits of Apotex’s investment” to its competitors. 71 It challenged
administrative and judicial decisions regarding Apotex’s ANDAs issued based on the
U.S. rules and procedures for generic marketing approval. Damages were claimed in
the amount of $8,000,000.72 In response, the U.S. argued that Apotex’s claims under
NAFTA Article 1110 were “without merit” as, first, the applications for generic
approval did not constitute an “investment” under NAFTA Article 1139, and second,
Apotex did not provide support “for its assertion that any of the various
administrative and judicial decisions taken by U.S. federal courts and FDA were
tantamount to an expropriation.”73 The question of whether the effect of the
enforcement of the drug approval regulation on Apotex’s ability to enter the market
indeed amounted to expropriation was not decided by the tribunal, as all claims were
subsequently dismissed due to the tribunal’s lack of jurisdiction ratione materiae and
ratione temporis.74
To support the expropriation claim, an investor would need to prove the
impairing effect of a contested regulatory measure on the investment. When raising
the expropriation argument, Apotex could relate the U.S. FDA’s decision not to grant
marketing authorization with the commercialization of its products. In the case of
clinical data, the causal relationship between the regulatory measure enabling data
disclosure for non-commercial, public interest purposes and the impairment to
commercial viability of investment appears less evident. Does clinical data disclosure
hinder the investor’s ability to utilize the data as an asset, or deprive the investor
from benefits accruing from its own use of data?
The tribunal would need to determine whether the contested policy measure
affects the value of data to an extent that it causes a loss to the investor’s business or
impairs enterprise operations. In the tobacco packaging dispute, Philip Morris
alleged that the effect of Australia’s plain packaging legislation amounted to
expropriation as it deprives the company of “the value of its shares, which is heavily
dependent upon the ability to use the intellectual property on or in relation to tobacco
products,”75 and that the interference of Uruguay’s regulation with the exercise of
trademark rights resulted “in a substantial reduction of the value” of the investor’s
71 Apotex v. the United States, Notice of Arbitration under Chapter 11 of the NAFTA, ¶ 75 (Jun.
4, 2009).
72 Apotex v. United States, supra note 38, ¶ 133.
73 Apotex v. United States, Statement of Defense, ¶ 44, (March 15, 2011).
74 Apotex v. United States, supra note 38, ¶ 337.
75 Philip Morris Asia Limited v. The Commonwealth of Australia, Notice of Arbitration,
UNCITRAL, PCA Case No. 2012-12, ¶ 7.3 (a) (Nov. 21, 2011) (emphasis added).

[15:228 2016]Protecting Trade Secrets under International Investment Law:
What Secrets Investors Should Not Tell States

243

enterprise and deprived it “of substantial revenue and profit.”76 In the case of clinical
data disclosure, it might be hard for an investor to defend an analogous argument.
The imposed limitation on the commercial use of trademark rights can objectively
interfere with the profitability of an enterprise. 77 Clinical data does not have a
comparable commercial use—the primary function of clinical dossiers is to support an
application for drug marketing approval. Thereafter, clinical reports are not used in
the course of drug production, in a way that such use would add value to the product
and contribute to a firm’s profits.
One can draw an analogy between the “forced” disclosure of regulatory data and
compulsory licensing of patents. The issuance of a compulsory license can interfere
with the patent holder’s interests and exercise of rights, while the validity and
ownership of patent rights remain intact. Regulatory disclosure involves limitation
of the investor’s discretion over clinical data (the EMA, for instance, grants access
without authorization of or compensation to the data originator). The main
difference between the two is that, in the case of compulsory licensing of patents, the
detrimental impact on enterprise profitability by the limitation of exclusive rights is
more evident than in the case of data disclosure for non-commercial use. Unlike a
patented technology, clinical data does not have a “productive use” in a sense that the
exclusion of competitors from such use in drug manufacturing would contribute to
the data holder’s market power.78
Within the public interest rationale for clinical data disclosure, one can
distinguish between the purpose of protecting public health and that of promoting
follow-on drug R&D.79 The former refers to situations when an authorised drug can
raise safety concerns.80 That would be perhaps a prima facie case when a regulatory
76 Philip Morris Brands Sàrl, Philip Morris Products S.A. and Abal Hermanos S.A. v. Oriental
Republic of Uruguay, ICSID Case No. ARB/10/7, Request for Arbitration, ¶ 87 (Feb. 19, 2010).
77 Studies find a positive relation between the use of trademark, brand recognition and loyalty,
and profitability. See, e.g., The World Intellectual Property Organization, 2013 World Intellectual
Property Report Brands—Reputation and Image in the Global Marketplace available at
http://www.wipo.int/edocs/pubdocs/en/intproperty/944/wipo_pub_944_2013.pdf (last visited Oct. 31,
2015) (summarizing that “while evidence generally supports a complementary relationship between
branding and advertising, in certain situations companies may find it more profitable to
differentiate themselves through image rather than through product innovation”).
See
generally C. J. Simon & M.W. Sullivan, The Measurement and Determinants of Brand Equity: A
financial Approach, 12 MARKETING SCIENCE, 28-52 (1993); Cobb-Walgren, et al., Brand Equity,
Brand Preference, and Purchase Intent, 24 JOURNAL OF ADVERTISING, 25 (1995); Brand Equity,
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT (Mie Augier & David Teece, eds., 2015) (quoting John
Stuart, co-founder of Quaker Oats saying “If this business were split up, I would give you the land
and bricks and mortar, and I would take the brands and trademarks, and I would fare better than
you”); P. Askenazy et al., Advertising and R&D: Theory and Evidence from France, Working paper,
Paris School of Economics (2010).
78 Such effect is associated with the referential use of clinical dossiers for the purpose of generic
drug approval.
79 For instance, the EMA policy differentiates between the purpose of “public scrutiny” and that
of the “application of new knowledge in future research.” See the EMA, supra note10, at 3-4.
80 Such concerns would normally be addressed under pharmacovigilance (post-marketing
surveillance) regulation that would provide for access to clinical dossiers for independent
investigators for the secondary analysis.
See the WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION (WHO),
PHARMACEUTICAL LEGISLATION AND REGULATION IN MANAGING ACCESS TO MEDICINES AND HEALTH
TECHNOLOGIES, at 6.8-6.9 (2012) (defining pharmacovigilance as an indispensable element of a
comprehensive drug law).
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intervention and investor’s loss caused by drug withdrawal from the market would be
justified. Whether there is such a compelling overriding public policy reason in the
case of disclosure of clinical dossiers to scientific purposes appears less clear. This
argument is of a different nature and involves the private interests of potentially
competing undertakings that can benefit from the use of data in their own drug R&D.
Access to particular parts of clinical dossiers can bear different implications for
new drug development. For instance, ‘raw’ patient-level data represents newly
established or specified pharmacological properties of tested chemical or biological
substances. Such scientific knowledge can support various R&D activities of
follow-on researchers such as discovery of new drug targets and molecules,
formulation of original hypotheses, analysis and determination of potential effects of
new drug candidates, their characterization in terms of therapeutic action and
safety.81 Besides patient-level data, clinical trial dossiers submitted for marketing
authorization can contain strategic and methodological documents related to product
development, manufacturing and commercialization. For instance, when objecting to
the disclosure of its clinical study reports by the EMA, AbbVie argued that
disclosure would undermine the protection of [AbbVie’s] commercial
interests [as] the applicants’ competitors could use the disputed
reports to improve their competitive position with (actually or
potentially) competing products in the highly competitive class of
TFN antagonists . . . [Clinical study] reports therefore provide a very
specific road map for a company wishing to develop a TNF antagonist
for the therapeutic use in question, by enabling it to develop a similar
‘biologics/biosimilar’ strategy in order to produce a follow-on
medicinal product or to add new therapeutic indications to an existing
medicinal product. The reports also provide information about some
of the hurdles the applicants had to overcome, which could reduce the
development process for a medicinal product by two to three years.82
Thus, the difference between a compulsory license for patents and regulatory
data disclosure can be seen in that, under a compulsory license, the patented subject
matter would be used to manufacture and commercialize a generic product, while the
disclosed clinical data are supposed to contribute to new drug development.83 Such
use is unlikely to cause an immediate impact on profits from sales of the drug for
which the dataset was initially generated to support marketing authorization. The
outcomes of ‘experimental’ use by third parties appear remote and probabilistic at the
81 See, e.g., Paul Nightingale & Surya Mahdi, The Evolution of Pharmaceutical Innovation, in
KNOWLEDGE ACCUMULATION AND INDUSTRY EVOLUTION. THE CASE OF PHARMA-BIOTECH, 73-111, at
81 (Mariana Mazzucato & Giovanni Dosi, eds., 2006) (viewing the “problem of curing a disease [as] a
hierarchy of increasingly specific sub-problems involving iterative cycles of testing, understanding,
modifying, and retesting potential solutions”, and deliberating that “[i]n each step, scientific
knowledge can be used to guide problem-solving and reduce the number of experimental dead ends
that are pursued”). See also infra notes 130-134.
82 Case T-44/13 R, AbbVie, Inc. v. European Medicines Association, Order of the President of the
General Court, ¶ 60 (25 April 2013) (emphasis added).
83 See the European Medicines Association Policy, supra note 10, ¶ 4.1 (stipulating that access
to data is granted “to enable . . . application of new knowledge in future research”).
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point of data disclosure, and can depend on a particular research project and the
period when data are utilized, e.g., at an early stage of research when an original
hypothesis is formulated, or during the more mature, pre-market product
development. It may take years until the results of the follow-on R&D activity can be
commercialized.
In this regard, experimental use contrasts the so-called referential use of clinical
data for the purpose of generic approval.84 In case of the latter, the launch of a
generic drug can offset the investor’s share in the relevant market. The submission
of clinical data is a regulatory requirement that enables market access; the grant of
marketing authorization does not come with monopoly-type legal protection. High
costs of data generation can serve as a de facto market barrier and potentially
eliminate competition in a specific drug market. However, data disclosure for
experimental purposes would not remove this barrier for potential competitors. Nor
would it interfere with the commercialization of the investor’s drug.
The investor can argue that the disclosure of clinical data can confer a
competitive advantage on competitors and speed up development and
commercialization of new drugs.85 However, third parties’ benefits resulting from the
experimental use of data might not necessarily be offset by the data originator’s loss.
First, the use of data in drug R&D is non-rivalrous; clinical data can be used in
parallel R&D activities, i.e., third parties’ use would not impede the originator’s
R&D. Second, experimental use may or may not result in a new product. Even if it
does, the new drug may or may not compete with the originator’s drug in the future.
Overall, probabilistic and remote prospects of the outcomes of research use of data do
not provide a strong basis for a claim that the disclosure would impair the economic
viability of the investor’s business activity to an extent that it can amount to
investment expropriation.
B. The assessment under the FET Standard
The implementation of the 2015 EMA disclosure policy took over two years and
was preceded by public consultations; its conditions apply vis-à-vis all holders of
marketing authorizations granted by the EMA. Executed in a transparent and
consistent way, the disclosure measure lies outside of the core area of the FET
principle that is associated with protection against arbitrariness and the denial of
justice. However, recent developments in tribunal decisions brought some novelties
84 That is, when a drug authority evaluates a generic application on the basis of the clinical trial
reports submitted by the originator company for marketing approval of its product. To obtain
marketing authorization, a generic company needs to prove bioequivalence with the originator drug,
but it is exempted from conducting full-scale clinical trials to demonstrate drug efficacy and safety.
85 The argument that access to clinical dossiers can provide a springboard in the developmental
work for a competing product, for instance, was raised by AbbVie that objected to the disclosure of
its clinical data by the EMA. See Case C-389/13 P(R), European Medicines Agency v. AbbVie, ¶ 18
(arguing that “clinical study reports describe the manner in which the AbbVie companies planned
and implemented the clinical trials necessary in order to obtain the MA [marketing authorization]
for that medicinal product for the indication of Crohn’s disease and therefore provide a very specific
road map for a company wishing to develop a medicinal product in the very competitive field of
tumour necrosis factor (TNF) antagonists”) (emphasis added).
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in interpretation of the FET standard that can potentially broaden the scope of its
application. Of particular interest is the notion of “legitimate expectations.”
In the aforementioned tobacco and trademark disputes, the claimants invoked
the notion of legitimate expectations alleging violation of the FET standard. 86 It
remains to be seen how this notion will be interpreted by tribunals when assessing
IP-related investment claims.87 In general, legitimate expectations can hardly be
considered as a well-established legal doctrine adding a substantively new dimension
to the content of the FET standard; nor has it been consistently applied in arbitral
decisions.88 Some tribunals recognize that investor’s legitimate expectations can be a
relevant factor within the FET standard. 89 However, the meaning of “expectations”
was mainly associated with protection against regulatory measures enforced by the
host states in an arbitrary way.90 The liability threshold was set considerably high—
to constitute a violation, a state would need to “transform and alter the legal and
business environment under which the investment was decided and made,”91 or
“completely dismantle the very legal framework constructed to attract investors.” 92
In some cases, tribunals interpreted the notion of expectations as being confined to
expectations to earn returns on investment. For instance, in El Paso it was held that
“a balance should be established between the legitimate expectation of the foreign
investor to make a fair return on its investment and the right of the host State to

86 Eli Lilly and Company v. The Government of Canada, UNCITRAL, ICSID Case
No. UNCT/14/2, Notice of Arbitration, ¶¶ 73, 76-77, 81 (Sep. 12, 2013); Philip Morris v. Australia,
supra note 75, ¶ 7.7.
87 At the time of submitting this article, the decision in the Eli Lilly case is still pending. See
International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), Case Details, Eli Lilly and
Company
v.
Canada
(ICSID
Case
No.
UNCT/14/2)
available
at
https://icsid.worldbank.org/apps/ICSIDWEB/cases/Pages/casedetail.aspx?CaseNo=UNCT/14/2 (last
visited Jan. 15, 2016). As for the Philip Morris v. Australia case, the tribunal decision dismissing
Philip Morris’ protection claim has been announced but not published. See Permanent Court of
Arbitration, PCA Case Repository, Case View available at http://www.pcacases.com/web/view/5 (last
visited Jan. 15, 2016).
88 See Kenneth J. Vandevelde, A Unified Theory of Fair and Equitable Treatment, 43
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLITICS, 43, 67 (2010) (arguing that [t]o the extent that the phrase
“legitimate expectations” refers to expectations created by host state promises or assurances, the
phrase does not exhaust the meaning of the fair and equitable treatment standard because the
standard embraces principles other than the security of expectations”); Michele Potestà, Legitimate
Expectations in Investment Treaty Law: Understanding the Roots and the Limits of a Controversial
Concept, 28 (1) ICSID REVIEW 88, 89 (2013) (pointing out “the lack of a rigorous analysis by arbitral
tribunal supporting the use of legitimate expectations [that] characterizes the majority of
investment treaty awards”).
89 Técnicas Medioambientales Tecmed, S.A. v. Mexico, ICSID Case No. ARB (AF)/00/2, Award
(May 29, 2003); Saluka Investments BV v. Czech Republic, UNCITRAL-PCA, Partial Award, ¶ 309
(Mar. 17, 2006); LG&E Energy Corp. et al. v. Argentine Republic, Decision on liability, ICSID Case
No. ARB/02/1 (Oct. 3, 2006); Alpha Projektholding v. Ukraine, Award (Nov. 8, 2010); Impregilo
S.p.A. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/17, Award (Jun. 21, 2011); Spyridon Roussalis
v. Romania, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/1, Award (Dec. 7, 2011).
90 Alpha Projektholding, supra note 89, ¶ 420.
91 CMS Gas Transmission Company v. Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/08, Award, ¶ 275
(May 12, 2005).
92 LG&E Energy Corp et al. v. Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/1, Decision on Liability,
¶ 139 (Oct. 3, 2006).
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regulate its economy in the public interest.” 93 Such view appears in line with the
concept of investment as a commitment of resources made with the assumption of
risk and in the expectation of a commercial return.94 In general, tribunals have been
rather reluctant to recognize investors’ expectations that the regulatory framework
can remain “frozen” after an IIA is signed. 95
The notion of expectations is inherently subjective and the legal standard of
protection cannot possibly accommodate investors’ individual perceptions of how
their investments should be treated.96 Several qualifying factors have been advanced
by the tribunals to set boundaries to the scope of protection against regulatory
changes that may contradict investors’ expectations. In particular, legitimate
expectations shall be analysed objectively, in light of the circumstances that could
have induced such expectations, 97 while most weight should be given to precise and
explicit assurances and representations provided to the investor by the host state. 98
Specific provisions within a regulatory framework should be of such material
importance that the investor would need to rely on them when making investment
decision.99
93 El Paso Energy International Company v. Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/15, Award,
¶ 358 (Oct. 31, 2011) (emphasis added).
94 See, e.g., Tecmed, supra note 89, ¶ 149 (recognizing the claimant’s expectation “of a long-term
investment relying on the recovery of its investment and the estimated return through the operation
of the Landfill during its entire useful life”).
95 CME v. Czech Republic, UNCITRAL, Partial Award, ¶ 356 (Sep. 13, 2001); OEPC v. Ecuador,
UNCITRAL/LCIA Case No. UN 3467, Final Award, ¶ 191 (July 1, 2004); CMS Gas Transmission
Company v. Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/08, Award, ¶ 274 (May 12, 2005); Saluka, supra
note 89 ¶¶ 305, 351 (Mar. 17, 2006); Continental Casualty Company v. Argentina, ICSID Case
No. ARB/03/9, Award, ¶ 258 (Sep. 5, 2008); Total S.A. v. Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/04/01,
Decision on Liability, ¶ 115 (Dec. 27, 2010); El Paso v. Argentina, supra note 93, ¶ 352. See also
Potestà, supra note 88, at 113 (concluding that “[i]f one attempts to piece together what emerges
from the latest awards which have examined this topic, one can see that there has been a gradual
limitation of the more far-reaching dicta found in the first generation cases seen above”).
96 Saluka, supra note 89, ¶ 304 (holding that “the scope of the Treaty’s protection of foreign
investment against unfair and inequitable treatment cannot exclusively be determined by foreign
investors’ subjective motivations and considerations”).
97 El Paso v. Argentina, supra note 93, ¶ 356.
“FET can be linked to foreign investors’
legitimate and reasonable expectations, [however] these expectations, as well as their violation,
have to be examined objectively”, and that “legitimate expectations cannot be solely the subjective
expectations of the investor, but have to correspond to the objective expectations than can be
deduced from the circumstances.” Id., ¶ 358; White Industries v. India, Final Award, ¶ 5.2.20
(Nov. 30, 2011) (denying protection as there was “no specific representation to [the claimant] . . . and
no reliance (let alone reasonable reliance) on any such representation”).
98 Continental Casualty v Argentina, supra note 95, ¶ 259; Total S.A. v. Argentina, ICSID Case
No. ARB/04/01, Decision on Liability, ¶¶ 120-121 (Dec. 27, 2010); Oostergetel, Laurentius v.
Slovakia, UNCITRAL, Final Award, ¶ 236 (Apr. 23, 2012). See Potesta, supra note 88, at 98-113
(identifying “patterns of governmental conduct which tribunals have found to be susceptible of
generating legitimate expectations deemed worthy of protection” and distinguishing between
contractual assurances, informal assurances and general regulatory framework as sources of
investor’s expectations).
99 See, e.g., Joseph Charles Lemire v. Ukraine, Decision on Jurisdiction and Liability, ¶ 264
(Jan. 14, 2010) (stating that “[t]he FET standard is thus closely tied to the notion of legitimate
expectations—actions or omissions by Ukraine are contrary to the FET standard if they frustrate
legitimate and reasonable expectations on which the investor relied at the time when he made the
investment”).
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To support a claim for protection under the FET principle, instead of the
nebulous notion of legitimate expectations, an investor should invoke specific
provisions under the respective IIA that could be interpreted as giving rise to the
obligation to treat regulatory data in a particular way. 100 In the absence of explicit
commitments or assurances to maintain the confidentiality of data upon regulatory
review, the investor may try to identify provisions under the sectorial regulations
applicable to clinical data, or legal norms generally applicable to confidential
commercial information and trade secrets at the time of making an investment that
would guarantee confidentiality protection. 101 Administrative law might contain
provisions stipulating that the data submitted for regulatory review shall not be
disclosed to third parties. Furthermore, the investor can resort to the customary
treatment of clinical reports: dossiers submitted for the purpose of drug marketing
approval can be held by a drug authority upon the decision to grant or deny
marketing authorization, but normally they are not disclosed to third parties. 102
1. International IP protection standards for pharmaceutical test data as a source of
“legitimate expectations”
In trademark and patent related disputes, claimants invoke obligations under
the TRIPS Agreement as a source of their expectations for investment protection. 103
Article 39(3) of the TRIPS Agreement (“TRIPS 39(3)”) applies to pharmaceutical test
100 See the Clinical trial Advisory Group on Legal aspects (CTAG5), Advice to the European
Medicines
Agency,
lines
217-223
(30
April
2013)
available
at
http://www.ema.europa.eu/docs/en_GB/document_library/Other/2013/04/WC500142857.pdf
(last
visited Jan. 13, 2016) (mentioning among the arguments against the EMA proactive disclosure of
clinical trial reports that “Bilateral agreements normally protect strategic partnerships in the
development of know-how in research and development of the product and the underpinning
technology. Such agreements usually contain a confidentiality clause upon the contracting parties
that is actionable in case of breach. It is generally expected that the confidential nature of such
information (particularly that concerning the manufacturing and control of the product and detailed
pre-clinical testing data and clinical strategic plan) is respected by the competent authorities during
the course of the regulatory review.”).
101 The determination of the legal status and substantive rights in data comprised in clinical
reports can be complex and jurisdiction specific. In the U.S., for instance, the regulatory framework
applicable to clinical data submitted to the Food and Drug Administration includes the Freedom of
Information Act, regulations of the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetics Act, the Federal Trade
Secrets Act, state trade secret law, constitutional takings doctrine. See Mustafa Ünlü, It Is Time:
Why the FDA Should Start Disclosing Drug Trial Data, 16 MICH. TELECOMM. TECH. L. REV. 511,
520 (2010) (concluding that such “confusing, complicated, and sometimes contradictory regime
contributes to the creation of legal bottlenecks”). In the EU, there has been no CJEU decision that
would provide “any useful indictors as to whether highly technical scientific documents, such as
[clinical and non-clinical study] reports, should receive, by virtue of their very nature, confidential
treatment”. See Case T-235/15 R, Pari Pharma GmbH v. EMA, Order of the President of the
General Court, September 1, 2015, ¶ 61. Furthermore, the General Court concluded that “there is
no case-law that would make it possible to give a ready answer to the questions of confidentiality
that fall to be decided in the present case by the future judgment on the substance.” Id., ¶ 62.
102 In this regard, the EMA 2015 disclosure policy sets a precedent, when a drug authority
grants access to clinical dossiers submitted for the regulatory review to third parties.
103 Eli Lilly v. Canada, supra note 86, ¶ 42; Philip Morris v. Australia, supra note 75, ¶ 6.6, 6.7;
Philip Morris v. Uruguay, supra note 76, ¶ 85.
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data submitted for the drug regulatory review as lex specialis. The provision
stipulates the sui generis protection of data against unfair commercial use and
against disclosure:
Members, when requiring, as a condition of approving the marketing
of pharmaceutical or of agricultural chemical products which utilize
new chemical entities, the submission of undisclosed test or other
data, the origination of which involves a considerable effort, shall
protect such data against unfair commercial use. In addition,
members shall protect such data against disclosure, except where
necessary to protect the public, or unless steps are taken to ensure
that the data are protected against unfair commercial use.
Ironically, the provision on trade secrets appears a mystery and poses an
interpretative challenge regarding the minimum international requirement for test
data protection.104 Protection obligation is conditioned on the equivocal notion of the
“unfair commercial use” that, up-to-date, has not been interpreted in WTO
jurisprudence.105 The agreement’s travaux préparatoires suggest that, originally,
protection was directed at the referential use of clinical data for the purpose of
expedited generic drug approval.106 This, however, does not necessarily mean that
was the final result achieved during the TRIPS negotiations. Even if one assumes
that “unfair commercial use” implies referential use for generic approval, the
debateable issue is whether the TRIPS Agreement stipulates protection in the form
104 It goes beyond the scope of this inquiry to review policy and academic debate regarding the
question whether TRIPS 39(3) mandates the WTO member states to prohibit the referential use of
data for the expedited generic approval. For such analysis, see, e.g., Aaron Xavier, Secrecy,
Monopoly and Access to Pharmaceuticals in International Trade Law: Protection of Marketing
Approval Data under the TRIPs Agreement, 45 HARVARD INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL 443-502
(2004); UNCTAD- ICTSD, RESOURCE BOOK ON TRIPS AND DEVELOPMENT (2005); Lucas Arrivillaga,
An International Standard of Protection for Test Data Submitted to Authorities to Obtain Marketing
Authorization for Drugs, 6 J. WORLD INTELL. PROP. 139 (2005); Jean-Frédéric Morin, Tripping Up
TRIPS Debates: IP and Health in Bilateral Agreements, 1 INT. J. INTELL. PROP. MGMT 37 (2006);
Shamnad Basheer, Protection of Regulatory Data under Article 39.3 of TRIPs: The Indian Context,
Intellectual Property Institute (2006); Charles Clift, Data Protection and Data Exclusivity in
Pharmaceuticals and Agrochemicals, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY MANAGEMENT IN HEALTH AND
AGRICULTURAL INNOVATION: A HANDBOOK OF BEST PRACTICES (A. Krattiger et al., eds, 2007);
Jerome Reichman, Rethinking the Role of Clinical Trial Data in International Intellectual Property
Law: The Case for a Public Goods Approach, 13 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 1 (2009); Carlos M.
Correa Correa, Test Data Protection: Rights Conferred Under the TRIPS Agreement and Some
Effects of TRIPS-plus Standards, THE LAW AND THEORY OF TRADE SECRECY: A HANDBOOK OF
CONTEMPORARY RESEARCH 568 (Rochelle C. Dreyfuss & Katherine J. Strandburg, eds, 2011); NUNO
PIRES DE CARVALHO, THE TRIPS REGIME OF PATENTS AND TEST DATA (2014).
105 The
World Trade Organization, WTO Analytical Index: TRIPS available at
https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/analytic_index_e/trips_e.htm (last visited Jan. 13, 2016).
106 Many jurisdictions allow the approval of a generic product based on the bioequivalence
studies demonstrating interchangeability with the innovator drug, but not requiring to provide own
clinical data proving safety, quality and efficacy of a generic product. For the definitions of
bioequivalence, innovator, comparator and generic products, see THE WORLD HEALTH
ORGANIZATION, MARKETING AUTHORIZATION OF PHARMACEUTICAL PRODUCTS WITH SPECIAL
REFERENCE TO MULTISOURCE (GENERIC) PRODUCTS: A MANUAL FOR NATIONAL MEDICINES
REGULATORY AUTHORITIES (NMRAS) 41 (2011).
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of data exclusivity rule—i.e., not allowing generic approval based on the originator’s
data without her authorisation, or in the form of the liability rule—i.e., allowing the
approval of a generic product without the authorisation of but with compensation to
the data originator. 107
Notwithstanding the requirement under the TRIPS Agreement, protection of
pharmaceutical data in the mode of data exclusivity has been adopted by many
countries due to obligations under FTAs. For instance, all of the U.S. FTAs, although
differing in details, stipulate pharmaceutical test data protection of a minimum five
year exclusivity that, essentially, mirrors protection under the U.S. law. 108 Notably,
the U.S. Government itself seems uncertain as to whether the obligation under the
U.S. FTAs equals or exceeds the minimum standard of protection under the TRIPS
Agreement. In particular, the U.S. Government Accountability Office stated that
[w]hether FTA provisions on data exclusivity go beyond TRIPS is less
clear . . . . There are different interpretations of the obligations under
TRIPS 39(3), and exactly what practices can be considered a
fulfilment of this obligation. One interpretation of TRIPS 39(3)
requires members to grant the originator of the data a period of
exclusive use similar to that provided by data exclusivity laws in the
United States. Under this interpretation, FTA provisions do not go
beyond TRIPS. Others do not believe that Article 39(3) of TRIPS
confers exclusive rights, but instead simply requires countries to
prevent third parties from using the originators’ data for unfair
commercial purposes. This interpretation suggests that the FTA
provision goes beyond the TRIPS requirement.109
Under TRIPS 39(3), the protection obligation against data disclosure envisages
two exceptions: “except where necessary to protect the public” or “unless steps are
107 See Basheer, supra note 104, at 23-29 (2006) (discussing compensatory liability model as an
alternative approach to data protection and an intermediate standard under TRIPS 39(3)); Aaron
Xavier Fellmeth, Secrecy, Monopoly and Access to Pharmaceuticals in International Trade Law:
Protection of Marketing Approval Data under the TRIPs Agreement, 45 Harv. Int’l L.J. 443, 453
(2004) (proposing a “readjustable royalties model” based on the cost-sharing approach for regulating
the use of test data as a possible solution to reconcile imperatives of public health and innovation);
Jerome H. Reichman, Rethinking the Role of Clinical Trial Data, in International Intellectual
Property Law: The Case for a Public Goods Approach, 13 MARQ INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 1, 65-66
(2009) (arguing that TRIPS 39(3) “does not prevent governments from authorizing the generic
manufacture of bioequivalent products on the basis of foreign regulatory approvals and the relevant
scientific literature. . . . If some form of compromise on the issue of clinical test data becomes
unavoidable, developing country negotiators should stand firm on cost-sharing counter-proposals
that would at least avoid barriers to entry for generic producers.”).
108 See Valdés & McCann, supra note 68, Annex IV. For an overview of data exclusivity regimes
in 44 jurisdictions, see INTERNATIONAL FEDERATION OF PHARMACEUTICAL MANUFACTURES AND
ASSOCIATIONS (IFPMA), DATA EXCLUSIVITY: ENCOURAGING DEVELOPMENT OF NEW MEDICINES
(2011)
available
at
http://www.ifpma.org/fileadmin/content/Publication/IFPMA_2011_Data_
Exclusivity__En _Web.pdf (last visited Jan. 13, 2016).
109 See the U.S. Government Accountability Office, U.S. Trade Policy Guidance on WTO
Declaration on Access to Medicines May Need Clarification, GAO Report 07-1198, 30-31 (2007)
available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d071198.pdf (last visited Nov. 26, 2015) (emphasis
added).
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taken to ensure that the data are protected against unfair commercial use.” 110 These
two conditions are not cumulative and differ in the grounds for disclosure. Under the
first condition, data can be disclosed if, for instance, there are health risk concerns
over the safety of the marketed drug and access is needed for independent
investigators to conduct secondary analysis of the results. The second condition is,
again, contingent on the notion of “unfair commercial use.” If one assumes that it
refers to use for generic approval, data disclosure should be allowed upon the
expiration of the term of protection, either in data exclusivity or liability form. As
pointed out before, the EMA disclosure policy explicitly precludes the use of data for
the purpose of obtaining marketing authorization and only allows access for public
scrutiny (that would be within the first exception under TRIPS 39(3)), or for the
purpose of follow-on research.111 It appears uncertain whether the so-called
experimental or scientific use of test data for R&D purposes comes under the notion
“unfair commercial use.”112
The EMA equates research use with use for
non-commercial purposes.113 An issue might be taken, however, with regard to the
‘non-commercial’ use of clinical data, as any activity in the course of drug R&D can be
viewed as potentially directed at the subsequent commercialisation of a new drug. At
the same time, the possible impact of third parties’ access to data for R&D purposes
on investor’s profits, in terms of the prospective development and introduction of a
new product, is hypothetical and can hardly be ascertained and evaluated at the time
when access to clinical reports is granted.
Given much ambiguity regarding the requirement under TRIPS 39(3),
compliance with international standard for test data protection can hardly form a
strong basis for the investor’s reasonable and legitimate expectations in situations
when data are disclosed for public interest reasons. 114 Data disclosure policy can be
an unwelcome surprise for pharmaceutical companies. However, the claim that the
TRIPS Agreement, Article 39(3).
See the EMA Policy, supra note 10, ¶ 4.1 and Annex 1, ¶ 3 (stipulating that “[w]hen using
the Clinical Reports, the User shall . . . not use [reports] . . . for any other purpose than general
information and non-commercial purposes, including non-commercial research purposes”; and “the
User may not use the Clinical Reports to support an application to obtain a marketing authorisation
and any extensions or variations thereof for a product anywhere in the world”).
112 On the proportionality and necessity test with regard to public interest exception provided
under Article 39(3) of the TRIPS Agreement, see Trudo Lemmens & Candice Telfer, Access to
Information and the Right to Health: The Human Fights Case for Clinical Trials Transparency,
1 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF LAW AND MEDICINE 38, 63-112, at 88-89 (2012) (arguing for the
“disclosure-friendly” interpretation of the obligation under Article 39(3) of the TRIPS Agreement).
See Daria Kim, Enabling Access to Clinical Trial Data: When is Unfair Use Fair? CHICAGO-KENT
JOURNAL OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 14:2 (2015) (arguing that access to clinical data for research
purposes does not violate protection obligation TRIPS 39 (3), even if such use can confer commercial
benefits on follow-on innovators).
113 See the EMA, supra note 10, ¶ 4.2.1, Annex 1, ¶ 3, Annex 2, ¶ 3.
114 Should the investor intend to challenge the compliance of the disclosure policy with the
obligation under the TRIPS Agreement, it would need to persuade its own government to initiate
dispute settlement proceedings in the WTO. See Christopher Gibson, A Look at the Compulsory
license in Investment Arbitration: The Case of Indirect Expropriation, AMERICAN UNIVERSITY
INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW 25 (3) 357, 401-417 (2010) (analyzing the application of expropriation
standard in disputes involving compulsory licenses for patents, and comparing investor-state
arbitration and WTO dispute settlement as potential options for the investor to enforce protection
claims against a compulsory license).
110
111
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investor relied on the confidentiality protection of clinical dossiers when making
investment decisions appears disproportionate in relation to other factors of
investment amortization such as market size and economic conditions of a recipient
state.115 Regulatory measures can vary significantly in terms of the magnitude of a
change, underlying policy objectives and the gravity of the impact on investment.
Data disclosure for non-commercial purposes bears, by far, less impact on the
investor’s profits if compared with measures such as drug price regulation or policies
promoting generic competition.
2. The proportionality test and balance of interests
Some tribunals, when assessing “legitimate expectations” claims, resorted to the
proportionality test and balance of interests. In El Paso, for instance, the tribunal
held that the notion of legitimate expectations itself is “the result of a balancing of
interests and rights, and that it varies according to the context”116 and should be
assessed “with due regard to the rights of the State.” 117 In Oostergetel, the tribunal
agreed that “stability of the legal and business environment does not equate
immutability of the legal framework and that legitimate expectations must be
measured through a balancing test taking account of specific circumstances.” 118
Questions arise: In what sense is balancing a measure of the “legitimacy of
expectations”? What is the relevance of correlating the legitimacy of investor’s
ex ante expectations for protection with an ex post regulatory act?
In Saluka, the tribunal hinted at the unenforceability of obligations under
investment treaties that are “inappropriate and unrealistic” if interpreted “too
literally.”119 The tribunal also emphasized that “the scope of the Treaty’s protection
of foreign investment against unfair and inequitable treatment cannot exclusively be
determined by foreign investors’ subjective motivations and expectations”, and “in
order . . . to be protected, [expectations] must rise to the level of legitimacy and
reasonableness in light of the circumstances.”120
While qualifiers such as
“inappropriate and unrealistic” might be of little guidance for the assessment, this
view suggests the application of a tentative rule of thumb to determine whether
expectations for protection extend beyond the scope of the state’s discretion to
regulate in the areas of public concerns. As the tribunal in S.D. Myers v. Canada
held, the determination of a breach of the investment protection obligation “must be
made in light of the high measure of deference that international law generally
115 For factors bearing on the FDI decision making, see, e.g., John H. Dunning, Global
Capitalism, FDI and Competitiveness (2002); Nauro F. Campos & Yuko Kinoshita, Why Does FDI
Go Where it Goes? New Evidence from the Transition Economies, International Monetary Fund
Working Paper WP/03/228 (2003); Ashoka Mody & David Wheeler, International Investment
Location Decisions: the Case of U.S. Firms, 33 (2) J. INT. ECON 57 (1992); Florence Jaumotte,
Foreign Direct Investment and Regional Trade Agreements: The Market Size Effect Revisited,
International Monetary Fund Working Paper WP/04/206 (2004).
116 El Paso v. Argentina, supra note 93, 356.
117 Id., 358.
118 Oostergetel, supra note 98, ¶ 118 (emphasis added).
119 Saluka, supra note 89, ¶ 304.
120 Id.
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extends to the right of domestic authorities to regulate matters within their own
borders.”121 In other words, investors should not expect too much.
Balancing can be applied in the arbitral analysis for different reasons. For
instance, in the El Paso award, the tribunal, on the one hand, held that “the
determination of a breach of the FET obligation . . . requires a weighing of the
Claimant’s legitimate and reasonable expectations on the one hand and the
Respondent’s legitimate regulatory interests on the other,”122 in other words, to
determine whether the protection obligation was breached by a policy measure. On
the other hand, it noted that “[i]n order to determine whether frustration of the
foreign investor’s expectations was justified and reasonable, the host State’s
legitimate right subsequently to regulate domestic matters in the public interest
must be taken into consideration as well,” 123 i.e., using balancing at the defense
stage.124
The proportionality test asks the following question: Is the loss caused to
investment proportionate to the benefits of the regulatory measure? In other words,
were the means proportionate to the objectives? In this sense, the idea of
proportionality is akin to the concept of the necessity defense under customary
international law. In Philip Morris v. the Government of Australia, the tobacco
company claimed that “the benefits of the legislation (if any) are entirely
disproportionate to the harm it will cause to PM Asia’s investment; accordingly, the
legislation is not fair and equitable in any sense.”125 The question is how to find
comparable values to measure costs and benefits and weigh up the harm to private
interests of a single investor and potential benefits to the public? The two appear to
be in different “weight categories.”
This article does not intend to analyse how the concept of proportionality should
be implied in balancing the rights of investors and public interests. 126 For the
purpose of this discussion, several possible arguments can be pointed out that can be
raised in response to investor’s protection claim, either when determining whether
protection obligation is breached by data disclosure, or whether the breach is
justified.
From the policymaking perspective, access to clinical data can support a range of
objectives. In the area of public health, it can improve drug safety and quality,
contribute to the transparency in decision-making of drug authorities, and reduce the
risk of publication bias in reporting trial results. 127 Clinical trials are subject to
121 S.D.
Myers, Inc. v. Government of Canada, UNCITRAL, Partial Award, ¶ 263
(Nov. 13, 2000). See also, Saluka, supra note 89, ¶ 305; and Joseph Charles Lemire, supra note 99,
¶ 505 (both decisions upholding S.D. Myers on this point).
122 El Paso, supra note 93, ¶ 305 (emphasis added).
123 Id., ¶ 358 (emphasis added).
124 Alec Stone Sweet, Investor-State Arbitration: Proportionality’ New Frontier, 4 (1) LAW &
ETHICS OF HUMAN RIGHTS 47, 63 (2010) (arguing “that hindrance [to investment] may nonetheless
be mitigated or justified to the extent that the measures taken were not arbitral, and were meant to
serve a proper good”).
125 Philip Morris, supra note 75, ¶ 45.
126 For a comprehensive analysis, GEBHARD BÜCHELER, PROPORTIONALITY IN INVESTOR-STATE
ARBITRATION (2015); Benedict Kingsbury & Stephan Schill, Public Law Concepts to Balance
Investor’s Rights with State Regulatory Actions in the Public Interest - the Concept of Proportionality,
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND COMPARATIVE PUBLIC LAW (Stephan Schill, ed., 2010).
127 See THE ROYAL SOCIETY, SCIENCE AS AN OPEN ENTERPRISE 43 (2012).
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mandatory registration with the subsequent reporting of the results; 128 however, data
disclosed voluntarily represent “the tip of the iceberg”—clinical trial dossiers
submitted by drug sponsors for marketing authorization represent, by far, more
detailed records than published synopses of trials' main findings. 129
From an innovation perspective, access to clinical data can lead to a superior
product being developed and launched at a faster rate. As aspired to by the EMA,
access to clinical trial dossiers allows groups to “avoid [the] duplication of clinical
trials, foster innovation and encourage development of new medicines.”130 One of the
objectives behind the EMA’s disclosure policy is “to enable the wider scientific
community to make use of detailed and high quality clinical trial data to develop new
knowledge in the interest of public health.”131 Along the same lines, the European
Commission,132 the WHO,133 and the Institute of Medicine of the National

128 See, e.g., EU Clinical Trials Register https://www.clinicaltrialsregister.eu (containing data on
clinical trials conducted in the EU or the European Economic Area after May 1, 2004); the World
Health Organization, International Clinical Trials Registry Platform http://apps.who.int/trialsearch/
(last visited Nov. 27, 2015). While there is no binding obligation under international law regarding
clinical trials registration and results reporting, international ethical standards of conducting
clinical research are embedded in the Declaration of Helsinki on Ethical Principles for Medical
Research Involving Human Subjects (adopted by the 18th WMA General Assembly, Helsinki,
Finland, June 1964). Paragraphs 35 and 36 of the Helsinki Declaration stipulate that “[r]esearchers
have a duty to make publicly available the results of their research on human subjects and are
accountable for the completeness and accuracy of their reports. . . . Negative and inconclusive as
well as positive results must be published or otherwise made publicly available.”
129 On the selective and insufficient disclosure of clinical trial results, see Christopher W. Jones
et al., Non-publication of Large Randomized Clinical Trials: Cross Sectional Analysis, BMJ 347:
F6104 (2011) (reporting that “of 585 registered trials, 171 remained unpublished. These 171
unpublished trials had an estimated total enrollment of 299 763 study participants. The median
time between study completion and the final literature search was 60 months for unpublished
trials.”). On the problem of publication bias and selective reporting of clinical trial results, see
generally Peter C. Gøtzsche, Why We Need Easy Access to All Data from all Clinical Trials and How
to Accomplish It, 12 TRIALS, 249 (2011); MARCIA ANGELL, THE TRUTH ABOUT THE DRUG COMPANIES:
HOW THEY DECEIVE US AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT (2005); BEN GOLDACRE, BAD PHARMA: HOW
DRUG COMPANIES MISLEAD DOCTORS AND HARM PATIENTS (2012).
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http://www.ema.europa.eu/ema/index.jsp?curl=pages/special_topics/general/general_content_000555.
jsp (last visited Oct. 31, 2015).
131 The EMA Policy, supra note 10, at 4.
132 The European Parliament, the European Economic and Social Committee, On Scientific
Information in the Digital Age. Access, Dissemination and Preservation, at 2 (2007) available at
http://ec.europa.eu/research/science-society/document_library/pdf_06/communication-022007_en.pdf
(last visited Nov. 30, 2015) (“All research builds on former work, and depends on scientists’
possibilities to access and share scientific publications and research data. The rapid and widespread
dissemination of research results can help accelerate innovation and avoid duplication of research
efforts, although some delay for the first use by researchers or for commercial purposes can be
justified.”).
133 The World Health Organisation, WHO Statement on Public Disclosure of Clinical Trial
Results,at
3
(Nov.
26,
2015)
available
at
http://www.who.int/ictrp/results/WHO_Statement_results_reporting_clinical_trials.pdf?ua=1
(last
visited Oct. 30, 2015) (recognizing the importance if facilitating research through greater access to
primary datasets and supporting the development of “an enabling environment to allow data
sharing to maximise the value of health research data”).
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Academies134 emphasize that access to data can accelerate new drug development
and maximize the socio-economic value of research data. Similarly, the U.S. Centers
for Disease Control and Prevention and the Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease
Registry state that data sharing can “uncover new areas of research.”135 The
importance of facilitating drug research through greater access to primary data has
also been emphasized by the World Health Organisation. 136
In this context, the policy for clinical data disclosure for public interest purposes
can be viewed as a bona fide regulatory measure that can be justified on the grounds
of efficiency in R&D resource allocation; benefits for public health; and advancement
in science, technology and innovation. Data disclosure should withstand the test of
necessity both in situations involving concerns over the safety of the approved drugs,
and when access is required for follow-on R&D purposes. In the former case, clinical
dossiers submitted for regulatory review would present a unique source of
information for independent investigators to conduct secondary analysis. In the
latter case, disclosure would allow groups to avoid conducting duplicative trials in
order to test hypotheses that might have already been examined in earlier research.
Such repetitive research efforts can be viewed as ethically and economically
unjustifiable.
One of the primary rationales for investment protection is to provide conditions
for generating returns on investment. For instance, as was held in Malicorp v.
Egypt, the investment definition under the Egypt-United Kingdom bilateral
investment treaty “does not so much stress the contributions made by the party
acting, as the rights and assets that such contributions have generated for it.” 137
Furthermore, the tribunal emphasized that a protection obligation must be
understood in light of the objectives of the Egypt-United Kingdom bilateral
investment treaty and the ICSID, which are to “‘promote’ investment, [i.e.,] to create
the conditions that will encourage foreign nationals to make contributions [and], to
134 The Institute of Medicine of the National Academies, Sharing Clinical Trial Data.
Maximizing
Benefits,
Minimizing
Risk.
Report
Brief,
at
1,
4
available
at
http://iom.nationalacademies.org/~/media/Files/Report%20Files/2015/SharingData/DataSharingRep
ortBrief.pdf (last visited Jan. 13, 2016) (aspiring that [d]ata sharing could advance scientific
discovery and improve clinical care by maximizing the knowledge gained from data collected in
trials, stimulating new ideas for research, and avoiding unnecessarily duplicative trials. The
ultimate goal of data sharing should be to increase scientific knowledge, leading to better therapies
for patients. . . . Greater data sharing could enhance public well-being by accelerating the drug
discovery and development process, reducing redundant research, and facilitating scientific
innovation”).
135 The U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention and the Agency for Toxic Substances
and Disease Registry, Policy on releasing and sharing data, at 4 available at:
http://www.cdc.gov/maso/Policy/ReleasingData.pdf.
136 The World Health Organization, WHO Statement on Public Disclosure of Clinical Trial
Results,
available
at
http://www.who.int/ictrp/results/Draft_WHO_Statement_results_reporting_clinical_trials.pdf?ua=1
(stating that “[t]he benefit of sharing research data and the facilitation of research through greater
access to primary datasets is a principle which WHO sees as important. . . . WHO will continue to
engage with partners in support of an enabling environment to allow data sharing to maximise the
value of health research data.”) (emphasis added).
137 Malicorp v. Egypt, Award, ¶ 108, 7 February 2011.
The referenced Article 1(a) of the
Egypt-United Kingdom BIT provides for a standard, non-exhaustive list of assets that can qualify as
investment.
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that end, to ‘protect’ the fruits of such contributions.”138 In this view, when access to
clinical data is allowed for non-commercial public policy reasons and does not
interfere with the commercialization of investor’s drugs, access policy should not be
viewed as violating investment protection obligations.
IV. THE CONCLUSION
To answer the question stated in the title, investors might be wary to disclose to
state authorities, in the course of regulatory procedures, information that has
potentially high public interest.
Pharmaceutical companies can resort to
international investment law to challenge domestic policies enabling disclosure of
test data. However, in light of the specific characteristics of clinical data analysed
above, the prospects of investor-state arbitration appear rather weak for the investor.
Most challenging for the claimant would be to prove actual or potential financial loss
caused by third parties’ ‘non-commercial’ use of data. This does not preclude
investors from claiming protection under national trade secret law, though the
remedies might be less attractive than those that could be obtained under IIAs.
In more abstract terms, a dispute over pharmaceutical test data disclosure
explicates a conflict between private interests in confidentiality protection and public
interests in access to information.
Investment law—designed to regulate
international economic relationships—is perhaps not meant to answer the normative
question of under what circumstances certain type of information should be subject to
disclosure. Trade secrets can cover information of highly diverse contents and
economic value. In cases where confidentiality of data plays a crucial role for
appropriating returns on investment, the investor might have a more convincing
argument to challenge access-to-information public policies. Yet, it may still not
outweigh the public interest justification.
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Id., ¶ 110 (emphasis added).

